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Abstract
Digital transformation is becoming ubiquitous as
organizations increasingly rely on IT to create
business value. As a result, IT strategy is increasingly
intertwined with organizational strategy, with risks as
IT becomes progressively more important, requiring
both management and governance. Given boards of
directors are ultimately accountable for strategic
decision-making and control, these changes charge
boards with accountability for governing digital assets.
Whilst board-level IT governance should enable better
organizational performance, research suggests that the
value created by the board in governing IT depends on
the roles they play. In exploring these roles, we use the
more mature research domain of corporate
governance to develop improved understanding of the
type of board roles and the importance assigned by a
board to governing IT.

1. Introduction
In the last two decades there has been specific
focus on information technology (IT) governance, in
part as a consequence of IT’s centrality in facilitating
enterprise risk management and also in generating
value in digitized organizations [1-3]. Herein IT
governance is regarded as being “an integral part of
corporate governance for which the board is
accountable. It involves the definition and
implementation of processes, structures and relational
mechanisms that enable both business and IT
stakeholders to execute their responsibilities in support
of business/IT alignment, and the creation and
protection of IT business value” [4, p. 3].
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As a consequence, researchers have increasingly
called for greater engagement of boards of directors in
IT governance [5], with empirical evidence showing
that board-level IT governance enables improved
organizational performance [6-9]. In this regard the
governance style of boards is shown to have a
moderating effect [6, 10]. With the role of boards
chiefly defined in terms of ‘monitoring’ and ‘advising’
[11-13], the value created in governing IT is dependent
on boards’ enactment of these functions. Whilst prior
studies have explored the role of boards of directors in
corporate governance, there is a lack of research
specifically addressing their role in governing IT. In
response, this study uses the more mature research
domain of corporate governance to inform literature on
board-level IT governance by addressing the following
research questions:
RQ1: What role should boards play in governing IT?
RQ2: How can boards implement IT governance roles?
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 details the theoretical background, including
discussion about the constructs of corporate
governance and board-level IT governance, with a
specific focus on the roles of a board of directors.
Section 3 describes the research approach, and in
Section 4 we report the results which are discussed in
Section 5. Then, in Section 6, we outline implications
for theory and practice, with limitations and directions
for future research outlined in Section 7. Finally, in
Section 8 we conclude the paper.

2. Theoretical background
2.1. The board of directors and corporate
governance
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The board of directors, commonly referred to as
‘the board’, is the formal body constituted to oversee
all activities in an organization, with a key role in the
system of rules and practices by which an organization
is controlled and directed. This system, referred to as
‘corporate governance’, “involves a set of relationships
between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate
governance also provides the structure through which
the objectives of the company are set, and the means of
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance
are determined” [14].
Given the focus of corporate governance is upon
interaction between boards and senior organizational
executives, it is unsurprising that the literature on
corporate governance is characterized by a dominant
focus on agency theory. Implicit in this is the focus on
the role of a board of directors regarding controls [15,
16]. In accord with agency theory, in the context of
separation of ownership and control, conflicts may
arise due to differing levels of risk appetite and
differing interests [17] between the two key actors,
namely: the principal, who is the task-assigning actor,
and an agent who is the task-executing actor. In its role
related to corporate governance, a board should control
for the self-interest of executive management (the
agent) while protecting stakeholder (principal) interests
[18]. However, this dualistic perspective is challenged
as being inadequate in capturing all the complexity of
the board’s task [15, 16]. In arguing for greater
theoretical pluralism, prior research posits that rather
than replacing agency by another dominant theory,
differing theoretical perspectives should coexist,
thereby offering complementary views to explain
different board phenomena. Such alternative theories
include the resource based view of the firm, resource
dependence theory and stewardship theory [19].

2.1. Board-level IT governance
IT governance, as an integral part of corporate
governance [4], implicitly establishes a role for the
board of directors with a range of research and
practitioner sources supporting this perspective. For
example, Shleifer and Vishny [20, p. 737] define
corporate governance as “the ways in which suppliers
of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting
a return on investment”. Their definition emphasizes
the creation of value from investments, which
correlates with reference to investments being part of
defining IT governance i.e., “in support of (…) the
creation and protection of business value from ITenabled business investments” [4, p.3]. Further,
corporate governance regulatory requirements, such as

the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), oblige organizations to
report on the effectiveness of their internal control
systems. As IT is increasingly an essential component
of internal control systems [21], IT becomes inevitably
linked to corporate governance. This is explicitly
articulated by the International Standards for the
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, when it
states that “the internal audit activity must assess
whether the information technology governance of the
organization supports the organization’s strategies and
objectives” [22, p.13]. Similarly, South Africa’s code
of company governance (King IV) identifies
“technology and information governance” as one of the
functional areas of company governance [23].
These assumptions and/or requirements for IT
governance imply board involvement through linkages
with corporate governance. In this regard, two research
streams suggest that IT governance exists at the
managerial-level and at the level of the board of
directors [9], with the latter addressing the board
involvement in IT-related strategic decision-making
and control [8, 24]. This involvement is increasingly
imperative as digitized organizations face serious IT
risk-related consequences due to: cyber security [25];
the evolving reliance on big data [26]; and blockchain
[27]. For example, in 2018, the global average total
cost of data breaches (related to share price, reputation
and litigation) exceeded USD $3.86 million, while
organizations who contain a breach in less than 30 days
are estimated to save more than USD $1 million [28].
The organizational implications of such IT-related
exposures suggest an urgency for boards’ increased
engagement with IT governance for the direction and
control of their organizations’ digital assets [29].
Given the linkage between corporate and IT
governance, and the fact that digital transformation is a
key contributing factor to organization’s growing
complexity [30], we argue that board-level IT
governance research is in need of theoretical pluralism
and consideration of different board roles.

3. Research approach
In exploring the role of boards of directors in
governing IT, we first seek to clarify understanding
about corporate governance, with a specific focus on
the role played by boards. To ensure rigor in our
review of the corporate governance literature, we
sought a framework by which to guide this review.
Accordingly we adopted the framework by Huse [19],
who builds on the seminal work of Zahra and Pearce
[31], and integrates this with the fragmented research
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published subsequently. Huse’s framework combines
various theories and perspectives, which offers the
theoretical pluralism needed to identify the various
roles of the board in governing IT. It constitutes an
established, comprehensive and detailed overview of
six different roles for a board of directors. These roles
are framed in terms of: (1) behavioral control; (2)
advice and counsel; (3) output control; (4) networking,
lobbying, legitimating, and communication; (5)
strategic control; and (6) strategic participation [19].
Next, based on the IT governance literature that (at
least partially) focuses on board-level or director-level
matters, we sought to use a specific sample of IT
governance research in order to scope how these six
roles may be equated with IT governance roles. This
analysis involved a review of 32 board-level IT
governance papers, which were identified by Caluwe
and De Haes [5], with the addition of 8 papers,
published after their review.
To identify the presence, frequency and centrality
of concepts in this literature, we used qualitative
content analysis [32]. Based on our data set of boardlevel IT governance papers, this approach allowed us
to describe different board roles related to IT
governance. Specifically, by drawing on board roles as
identified in the corporate governance literature to
articulate this framework of six board roles, we created
a coding frame to guide our content analysis. This
frame comprises a description, an overview of related
theories, a list of what should constitute specific board
tasks, an explanation of the value created, an overview
of the ways in which the board roles can be
implemented and a list of key words describing each
board role.
The outcome from this manually executed content
analysis of our 40 identified papers is
conceptualization of the roles of the board with regard
to IT governance. Specifically, we derived an overview
of how each of the six board roles can relate to
executing IT governance. This analysis includes
identification of related and relevant theories, specific
board tasks, an explanation of the value created by
each role and their possible implementation. These
findings enable formulation of answers to both of our
research questions.

4. Results
4.1. Board roles in IT governance

In this section, we briefly describe each role of the
board in corporate governance and then outline what
this means in the context of IT governance.
4.1.1 Behavioral control. In general, the board’s
role in behavioral control, otherwise referred to as the
board’s monitoring function [16, 33], focuses on its
function regarding management behavior and
operational control [19]. This control is performed by
scrutinizing, evaluating and regulating the actions of
executive management [13, 18].
With regard to IT, boards are responsible for
monitoring/controlling managerial IT-related decisions
and actions [7, 34, 35]. In doing so, rather than judging
specific management decisions, boards should focus on
how executives handle decision-making and evaluate
whether they have established the correct procedures to
adequately manage IT [36]. Specifically, this role
requires boards to ensure that IT risks are identified
and addressed [37], to identify and monitor IT
performance objectives [7, 38], and to hire and fire a
CIO [34, 39]. Consistent with corporate governance
research findings, IT governance research draws on
agency theory to explain the board’s behavioral control
role [8, 34, 40]. Instances where boards should protect
the organization and its stakeholders against the selfinterested behavior of management include ensuring
that a manager does not make large IT investment for
the purpose of gaining his/her increased power by
enlarging the IT department [34] rather than for
organizational needs.
Ineffective IT investment behavior, which is
induced by management’s self-interested behavior,
may be avoided by effective board governance [8, 10,
34]. Further, increased board oversight of risk
management offers the potential to improve risk
mitigation [41, 42] and avoid costly lawsuits [43].
Specifically, boards’ IT-related behavioral control is
shown to positively influence the maturity of IT risk
management practices [44]. Thus, through behavioral
control, shareholder value is created [42, 45], by
lowering the cost of capital [42], and/or regaining
shareholders’ trust after operational IT failures [34,
41].
4.1.2 Advice and counsel. With respect to advice
and counsel, boards, based on their directors’ expertise
and experience [13, 46], play a key advisory role in
providing advice and feedback that informs and
counsels the CEO and executive management [12, 16,
18]. This role reflects aspects of stewardship theory,
wherein managers are considered trustworthy stewards
of the organization. Thus, the role advocates boards
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supporting management rather than monitoring them to
control self-interest [16, 47]. Further, research that uses
resource dependence theory to investigate this role
shows that directors’ competencies may be valuable
resources [18, 48].
In the context of IT governance, boards should
offer IT-related guidance and advice to management
[6, 34]. Resource dependence theory [34, 49] and
stewardship theory [8, 44] are also applied in IT
governance literature. From a resource dependency
perspective, directors with IT experience should add
value to an organization through their IT-related
expertise, such as knowledge related to governing IT
and IT outsourcing [8, 49, 50]. Stewardship theory
suggests that rather than controlling managers, boards
should offer advice and direction, such as indicating
potential IT strategies and risks [8].
Other examples of specific tasks related to this role
include creating an atmosphere of joint accountability
concerning IT resources and stimulating collaboration
between the CIO and executive management [6]. In
general, this advice and counsel role facilitates social
alignment by promoting trust between the board and
executives [10], and by supporting shared
understanding of how IT can add business value
through innovation and growth [51]. Further, board
members should enable a better fit between the needs
of the organization and the external environment [8],
and address risks of IT resource deficiencies [34] by
directing the attention of management and enhancing
the quality of their decisions.

committee with respect to IT relates to its
responsibilities
for
financial
reporting.
The
stakeholder-oriented aspect of the output control role is
referenced briefly in the board-level IT governance
literature. Herein, a specific task concerns ensuring
adequate reporting on IT-related matters to all
stakeholders [54]. Again, stakeholder theory is
relevant, as it is the board’s duty to monitor
management concerning IT-related issues in order to
safeguard the interests of all stakeholders [55].
4.1.4 Networking, lobbying, legitimating,
communication. Boards act as boundary spanners
between the organization and its environment [12, 18],
The networking, lobbying, legitimating and
communication role of the board are elements of its
service role, with a specific focus on the external
environment [19]. Theoretical grounding for this role is
evident in resource dependence theory [12, 16, 18], as
it advocates that “the organization’s need for resources
makes it potentially dependent on the external sources
of these resources” i.e., its environment [56, p. xii].
The essence of this role resides in the board’s relational
(also termed social) capital, which includes the board’s
links to the organization’s environment [18] (e.g.
customers, suppliers, investors etc.) [47]. Through their
relational capital, directors provide access to resources
required by the organization [12, 16, 18], facilitate
access to the commitment of outside parties [18], foster
communication between the organization and its
environment [18], perform a lobbying function [47]
and provide legitimacy [12, 57].

4.1.3 Output control. Since a board’s output
controls primarily relate to organizational outputs such
as corporate social responsibility and outputs in
financial markets [19], as with behavioral control, it
involves monitoring executive management, but with
an external focus. In accord with stakeholder theory,
this focus concerns the board’s responsibility for
protecting the interests not only of shareholders, but
also of other stakeholders such as employees, the local
community and the environment [52]. Advocates of
this role suggest that the application of agency theory
be broadened to include these various stakeholders as
principals rather than concentrating solely on an
organization’s shareholders [52, 53].

With respect to IT governance, this board role
entails two main functions: the provision of resources
[7, 34, 58]; and a signaling function [34, 41]. From a
resource dependency perspective, directors may
leverage their relationships with multiple organizations
to provide access to resources such as IT providers and
capital [8, 34]. The signaling function, which may be
considered part of a board’s legitimating role, relates to
signaling theory. This role involves establishing IT
governance mechanisms at board-level, thereby
signaling to the market that IT-related issues are
significantly situated on the board’s agenda [41],
thereby strengthening the public image of the firm’s IT
capability [34]. In this regard, agency theory is relevant
by demonstrating to the market the board’s role
regarding the strength of its IT oversight role [34].

A major element of board output control is
oversight of financial reporting. As this depends
heavily on IT, it is surprising that very few references
to this board responsibility are evident in our selected
set of IT governance papers. In this regard, Butler and
Butler [54] mention that the responsibility of the audit

It is the board’s task to use its directors’ ties to the
external environment to facilitate provision of ITrelated resources [7, 34, 39], thereby supporting
improved fulfilment of its organization’s internal needs
[8]. Further, by establishing IT governance
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mechanisms at the board-level, organizations
demonstrate the importance that they attribute to ITrelated matters, which in turn sends a positive signal to
the stock market, and therein possibly influences stock
returns. In this regard, Higgs, Pinsker [41] show that
negative market reactions to reported security breaches
are mitigated by the presence of a technology
committee, suggesting that the presence of such a
committee is positively perceived by the market (i.e., a
signaling function of the board).
4.1.5 Strategic control. The board’s role in
strategic control relates to its monitoring function,
particularly reviewing strategic initiatives and
overseeing the execution of strategy [59, 60]. In accord
with agency theory, this role entails boards being
responsible for monitoring strategic decisions, but not
their initiation and implementation [61]. From the
perspective of legal theory, a board can use its
fiduciary duty to control strategic decisions and
evaluate these for their organizational value [62].
In the context of IT governance, IT-related goals
and strategic proposals should be evaluated and
monitored [6, 9]. Again, the board should evaluate
management procedures, and verify whether
management has established effective strategic
planning processes [54]. Theoretical foundations for
this role include: (1) agency theory, in relation to
reducing the conflict of interest arising from the
possible misalignment between IT and the business
strategy [34, 63]; and (2) the resource based view of
the firm related to board IT competence as board
members’ strategic oversight constitutes a valuable
resource [40]. This board IT competence may be
considered as: a dynamic capability, based on the
resource based view of the firm; and a cognitive bias,
based on upper echelon theory, with regard to
influencing strategic choices and contributing to the
organization’s competitive advantage [64]. This
accords with strategic choice theory in that board
attributes (such as board IT competence, board size and
proportion of insider directors) may influence strategic
decision-making [9, 49].
In this regard, of primary concern is ensuring the
alignment of business and IT strategy, typically
phrased as strategic alignment [6, 51]. This requires the
board to ensure that IT’s role aligns with the
organization’s overall strategy.

becomes a strategic partner with management [65].
More specifically, this role entails boards assisting in
initiating strategic analysis [59, 66], as well as its
formulation [61, 65, 66], and implementation [59, 61].
As with the other service roles, perspectives here
accord with stewardship theory and resource
dependence theory. Importantly, by focusing on the
role of boards in empowering managers, stewardship
theory offers a different perspective from the agency
theoretic view of the self-interested manager [47, 61].
Equally, from a theoretical pluralistic perspective,
resource dependency theory suggests a critical role for
boards’ strategic decision-making in providing access
to strategic information and reducing uncertainty
through access to their network [61].
The board’s strategic participation should be
evident from its proactive engagement in IT-related
strategic decision-making [38, 67]. With IT budgets
averaging 3.64% of revenue across all industry sectors
in 2018 [68] and with spending on IT-related security
having increased by 10.5% in 2019, and cloud security
projected to grow 41.2% over the next five years [69],
IT risk exposures require strategic consideration. In
accord with corporate governance literature, IT
governance researchers build on stewardship theory, to
explain the need for advising management on ITrelated strategic matters [8] and on resource
dependence theory as related to networking by
directors for knowledge about market trends [8], and
thereby facilitating strategic discussions. Other
relevant theories include the resource-based view,
upper echelon theory and strategic choice theory for
their insights regarding the impact of board IT
competence and other attributes on strategic decisionmaking.
Through their networks, directors may be well
placed to garner information about the external
environment [6, 39]. Here board roles include
boundary spanning activities in order to inform the
strategy debate [58], and thereby complement
perspectives offered by executive management [6, 8,
39]. By providing information about the external
environment and thereby guiding management
regarding IT-related strategic topics, the board may
ensure that the organization identifies and grasps
relevant opportunities [6, 70].

4.2 Board-level IT governance mechanisms
4.1.6 Strategic participation. In this role, the focus
for boards concerns their active involvement in
strategic decision-making, rather than more passive
involvement in strategic control [18]. In setting the
strategic direction for the organization [65], the board

In this section, possible mechanisms to implement
board-level IT governance duties are discussed. A
summary of the mechanisms and their importance for
each board role in governing IT is provided in Table 1.
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Board-level IT governance committee
Board IT competence
Include independent directors (with IT expertise)
CIO presenting to the board
Communication between CIO and board in between board meetings
CIO on the board
Long-term compensation components for CIO
Formal communications and review processes
IT scorecards or dashboards
Frequent IT-related briefings

A certain level of IT competence is needed to
support the roles of the board in IT governance. In the
context of behavioral control, such competence
facilitates the reduction of information asymmetry
between boards and executives and thus enables better
evaluation of IT decisions [44, 67]. The board’s ability
to provide IT-related advice and counsel is enhanced
by recruiting directors with IT expertise [34]. In the
context of output control, the IT experience of audit
committee members should be taken into account [54].
Further, directors with IT awareness bring appropriate
IT-related networks that facilitate the provision of
resources in support of IT-related matters [50]. Lastly,
IT competence supports the board in its strategic
control [36, 50] and participation [8] roles. IT-related
knowledge, expertise, experience, industry and
educational background should be considered when
recruiting directors [34, 43]. This IT competence may
relate to directors with prior executive and/or board
experience in the IT sector which have gained
experience at the strategic level of the organization
[49]. When very specific knowledge is needed, boards
could consider hiring an expert [44]. Another strategy
linked to the board’s IT competency is to appoint a
specific director to take a leadership role with IT [36,
42]. Where boards have less IT expertise and their
organizations face increasing IT intensity, CIOs may
be encouraged to act in the shareholders’ interests by
increasing their long-term compensation [50].
Independent directors, especially those with IT
expertise, play an important role in governing IT. They
are typically considered responsible for monitoring
[34, 40] and are shown to enhance the board’s ability
to provide IT-related advice and counsel to
management [34] as they can bring insights on various

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

Strategic
participation

Networking,
lobbying,
legitimating and
communication

Advice and
counsel

Strategic control

Output control

Board-level IT governance mechanism

Behavioral
control

Table 1. Overview of board-level IT governance mechanisms for each role

x
x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

IT topics from other organizations [7, 39]. Moreover,
this type of board member offers network ties [34, 49,
71] and facilitates environmental scanning as part of
the board’s strategic participation role [34, 72, 73]. In
support of a stakeholder-oriented approach, inclusion
of external members such as public policy experts, may
contribute alternative viewpoints [73]. On the other
hand, inside directors are essential for ensuring that
firm-specific IT-related information is available to the
board [9]. Therefore, including the CIO on the board
may be valuable, as it enables them to directly interact
and share knowledge with other board members [51].
Other strategies include regular CIO presentations to
the board [74] and encouraging board members to
communicate with the CIO or IT management between
board meetings [38, 51]. All these mechanisms enable
the CIO to support the board in playing its behavioral
control [37], advice and counsel [51] and strategic
participation [8, 38] roles.
Researchers advise the establishment of a boardlevel committee with IT governance responsibilities for
all six roles discussed above [34, 39-41, 44, 45, 58,
75]. Depending on the type of organization, an audit
committee [36, 37] or the risk management committee
[37] may assume similar responsibilities, providing
they possess adequate IT-related competency [72].
Providing strategic oversight requires effective
communication to and by the board about the strategic
direction and progress of IT [38, 76]. Such
communication may be facilitated through formal
communication and review processes, as well as by
using scorecards or dashboards [38]. Lastly, the board
can require management to frequently brief them on IT
related matters in support of their advising role [8].
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5. Discussion
This study seeks to clarify current understanding
about the role of an organization’s board in IT
governance. As detailed in Section 1, the two research
questions framing our inquiry concern what these roles
are and how these roles may be implemented. By
drawing on literature concerned with corporate
governance in order to develop a coding frame
regarding the roles required for boards of directors in
executing corporate governance, we are able to apply
these findings to our conceptual content analysis of a
selected sample of literature concerned with boardlevel IT governance and thereby theoretically review
boards’ IT governance roles. These findings are now
discussed more specifically below.
Firstly, with regard to IT governance, we find that
the board has five main roles, namely: behavioral
control; strategic control; advice and counsel;
networking,
lobbying,
legitimating
and
communication; and strategic participation. Little
information was identified regarding the output control
role, which from a corporate governance perspective,
theoretically relates to controlling an organization’s
outputs, not only in the interest of shareholders, but for
all organizational stakeholders. An explanation for this
lack of evidence may relate to either the role being less
important in the context of IT, or being underresearched in IT governance literature. As one of the
main elements of the output control role, transparency
in IT governance, has received little attention in
academic research [77], it will not be included
hereafter in the discussion.
In terms of the definition of IT governance adopted
for the purposes of this study, IT governance is
fundamentally concerned with both the creation and
protection of IT business value [4]. Here, a number of
board roles are crucial in creating IT business value.
Strategic control and participation are important board
roles in ensuring strategic oversight. The behavioral
control role almost solely focusses on the protection of
IT business value. Both advice and counsel, and the
networking, lobbying, legitimating and communication
roles address creating and protecting IT business value.
Given that purely focusing on value protection is
insufficient, the board’s focus should go beyond
controlling management behavior. This finding accords
with the study of Turel et al. [6] who identified
detrimental effects from an authoritarian governance
style that focuses solely on monitoring aspects of
governance. Nevertheless, a single focus on value
creation is not beneficial either, meaning the board
should go further than just implementing strategic

roles. In summary, it is important that boards engage
with the breadth of their roles in order to optimally
contribute to IT governance, thereby supporting both
the protection and creation of IT business value.
The second research question relates to how these
board roles may be implemented. Whilst various IT
governance mechanisms were identified, three recur
for each role: board IT competence, including
independent directors (with IT expertise) and a boardlevel IT governance committee. Given these findings,
such mechanisms could be considered as a minimum
requirement for each board. Indeed, it seems evident
that a minimum level of IT competence at the boardlevel is required for a board to adequately perform IT
governance duties. Mechanisms to support this include
that appointments to the board should be considered in
terms of directors’ IT experience gained at a strategic
level, such as through prior board experience or
executive level positions held in IT organizations
and/or as a CIO or CTO [49]. As our findings show
that board roles require governing IT at a strategic
level, rather than dealing with the technical details, a
technical degree may be less valuable than strategic IT
experience. Interestingly, Vincent, Higgs [44] report
that whilst board IT competence positively influences
IT risk management maturity, board involvement is
more important, suggesting that simply attracting ITcompetent board members is insufficient. Indeed, our
results show that boards should contribute to governing
IT by performing a range of roles, with IT competence
being only one mechanism to support performance of
these duties.
Many of the identified IT governance mechanisms
relate to providing IT-related information to the board
e.g., meetings with the CIO, formal communications,
review processes and frequent IT-related briefings
occur. In providing this information, the board is
heavily reliant on executive management, with the CIO
playing a pivotal role. Through mechanisms such as
presentations to the board or communicating with the
board between board meetings, the CIO can bridge
between the board and the organization regarding ITrelated matters. This communication is shown to be
challenged, as some findings show that CIOs and
CTOs are reluctant to allow board interference in their
IT management roles [38]. In this regard, research
shows that management is more reluctant to share
information when boards emphasize monitoring,
whereas boards who adopt an advisory role stimulate
information exchange, as management expects this will
result in better advice [11]. Accordingly, to receive
necessary information on IT-related matters, it appears
crucial for a board to effectively perform its advice and
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counsel role. As findings show that receiving ITrelated information is especially important for
behavioral control and strategic control, we argue that
this advice and counsel role will indirectly support the
board in performing these control roles.

6. Limitations and future research
By building upon academic literature related to
corporate governance and IT governance, this research
offers opportunities for future research to extend
theoretical findings by incorporating insights from
practice. Further, given our limited findings concerning
a board’s output control role in IT governance, future
research could investigate whether this role is relevant,
or whether its purpose and value are yet to be
identified. Finally, building on studies showing that a
board’s governance style moderates the effect of
board-level IT governance on firm performance, it is
timely to investigate a board’s roles here and how this
moderating effect actually materializes.

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

7. Conclusion and implications
[8]

While prior studies have briefly touched upon
board duties with regard to IT, this research took a step
further in outlining the roles of the board in the context
of IT governance and possible ways of implementing
them, to develop a more concrete understanding of
board-level IT governance. Whilst we derive our
findings by building upon the more mature domain of
corporate governance, at the same time our results
inform the corporate governance literature. Here, as
digital transformation is a key factor contributing to
organizations’ growing complexity [30], our findings
related to the roles that boards should enact regarding
IT governance may relatedly inform corporate
governance research regarding board roles regarding
IT risk management. From a practitioner perspective,
our study provides clear guidance concerning how
boards can contribute to governing IT. Specifically, we
define their different roles, including examples of
specific tasks and guidance regarding ways to
implement these roles.

8. References
[1]

[2]

De Haes, S. and W. Van Grembergen, An
Exploratory
Study
into
IT
Governance
Implementations and its Impact on Business/IT
Alignment. Information Systems Management,
2009. 26(2): p. 123-137.
Wilkin, C.L. and R.H. Chenhall, A review of IT
governance: A taxonomy to inform accounting

[9]

[10]

[11]

[12]

[13]

[14]
[15]

[16]

information systems. Journal of Information
Systems, 2010. 24(2): p. 107-146.
Wilkin, C.L. and R.H. Chenhall, Information
Technology Governance: Reflections on the Past
and Future Directions. Journal of Information
Systems, 2019.
De Haes, S., et al., Enterprise Governance of
Information Technology: Achieving Alignment and
Value in Digital Organizations. 3 ed. Management
for Professionals. 2020, Switzerland: Springer.
204.
Caluwe, L. and S. De Haes, Board Level IT
Governance: A Scoping Review to Set the Research
Agenda. Information Systems Management, 2019.
36(3): p. 262-283.
Turel, O., P. Liu, and C. Bart, Board-Level
Information Technology Governance Effects on
Organizational Performance: the Roles of
Strategic Alignment and Authoritarian Governance
Style. Information Systems Management, 2017.
34(2): p. 117-136.
Turel, O., P. Liu, and C. Bart, Is board IT
governance a silver bullet? A capability
complementarity and shaping view. International
Journal of Accounting Information Systems, 2019.
33: p. 32-46.
Turel, O. and C. Bart, Board-level IT governance
and organizational performance. European Journal
of Information Systems, 2014. 23(2): p. 223-239.
Jewer, J. and K.N. McKay, Antecedents and
Consequences of Board IT Governance:
Institutional and Strategic Choice Perspectives.
Journal of the Association for Information
Systems, 2012. 13(7): p. 581-617.
Liu, P., O. Turel, and C. Bart, Board IT
Governance in Context: Considering Governance
Style and Environmental Dynamism Contingencies.
Information Systems Management, 2019. 36(3): p.
212-227.
Adams, R.B. and D. Ferreira, A theory of friendly
boards. The Journal of Finance, 2007. 62(1): p.
217-250.
Johnson, J.L., C.M. Daily, and A.E. Ellstrand,
Boards of directors: A review and research
agenda. Journal of management, 1996. 22(3): p.
409-438.
Sundaramurthy, C. and M. Lewis, Control and
collaboration: Paradoxes of governance. Academy
of management review, 2003. 28(3): p. 397-415.
OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance. 2015, Paris: OECD Publishing.
Roberts, J., T. McNulty, and P. Stiles, Beyond
agency conceptions of the work of the
non‐executive director: Creating accountability in
the boardroom. British journal of management,
2005. 16(s1).
Daily, C.M., D.R. Dalton, and A.A. Cannella,
Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and
data. Academy of management review, 2003.
28(3): p. 371-382.

8
Page 6054

[17]

[18]

[19]

[20]

[21]

[22]

[23]

[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]
[28]
[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]
[33]

Eisenhardt, K.M., Agency theory: An assessment
and review. Academy of management review,
1989. 14(1): p. 57-74.
Hillman, A.J. and T. Dalziel, Boards of directors
and firm performance: Integrating agency and
resource dependence perspectives. Academy of
Management review, 2003. 28(3): p. 383-396.
Huse,
M.,
Accountability
and
creating
accountability: A framework for exploring
behavioural perspectives of corporate governance.
British Journal of Management, 2005. 16(s1): p.
S65-S79.
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny, A survey of
corporate governance. The journal of finance,
1997. 52(2): p. 737-783.
Li, C., J.-H. Lim, and Q. Wang, Internal and
external influences on IT control governance.
International Journal of Accounting Information
Systems, 2007. 8(4): p. 225-239.
The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA),
International Standards for the Professional
Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards). 2016.
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA),
King IV Report on Corporate Governance for
South Africa 2016. 2016.
ISO/IEC, ISO/IEC Standard 38500: Information
technology - Governance of IT for the
organization. 2015.
Steinbart, P.J., et al., The influence of a good
relationship between the internal audit and
information security functions on information
security outcomes. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 2018. 71: p. 15-29.
Abbasi, A., S. Sarker, and R.H. Chiang, Big data
research in information systems: Toward an
inclusive research agenda. Journal of the
Association for Information Systems, 2016. 17(2):
p. 3.
PWC, Blockchain is here. What's your next move?
2020.
Ponemon, 2018 Cost of a Data Breach Study:
Global Overview. 2018.
Stafford, T., et al., The Role of Accounting and
Professional Associations in IT Security Auditing:
An AMCIS Panel Report. Communications of the
Association for Information Systems, 2018. 43(1):
p. 27.
Huse, M., Value-Creating Boards: Challenges for
Future Practice and Research (Elements in
Corporate Governance). 2018, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Zahra, S.A. and J.A. Pearce, Boards of directors
and corporate financial performance: A review and
integrative model. Journal of management, 1989.
15(2): p. 291-334.
Schreier, M., Qualitative content analysis in
practice. 2012: Sage Publications.
Adams, R.B., B.E. Hermalin, and M.S. Weisbach,
The role of boards of directors in corporate
governance: A conceptual framework and survey.

[34]

[35]

[36]

[37]

[38]

[39]

[40]

[41]

[42]

[43]

[44]

[45]

[46]

[47]

[48]

Journal of Economic Literature, 2010. 48(1): p. 58107.
Benaroch, M. and A. Chernobai, Operational IT
failures, IT value-destruction, and board-level IT
governance changes. MIS quarterly, 2017. 41(3):
p. 729-762.
Valentine, E. and G. Stewart, Enterprise Business
Technology Governance: Three Competencies to
Build Board Digital Leadership Capability, in
2015 48th Hawaii International Conference on
System Sciences, T.X. Bui and R.H. Sprague,
Editors. 2015: Kauai, HI. p. 4513-4522.
Trites, G., Director responsibility for IT
governance. International Journal of Accounting
Information Systems, 2004. 5(2): p. 89-99.
Posthumus, S., R. von Solms, and M. King, The
board and IT governance: The what, who and how.
South African Journal of Business Management,
2010. 41(3): p. 23-32.
Andriole, S.J., Boards of directors and technology
governance: The surprising state of the practice.
Communications of the Association for
Information Systems, 2009. 24(1): p. 22.
Turel, O., P. Liu, and C. Bart, Board-Level IT
Governance. IT Professional, 2019. 21(2): p. 5865.
Price, J.B. and N. Lankton, A Framework and
Guidelines for Assessing and Developing BoardLevel
Information
Technology
Committee
Charters. Journal of Information Systems, 2018.
32(1): p. 109-129.
Higgs, J.L., et al., The relationship between boardlevel technology committees and reported security
breaches. Journal of Information Systems, 2016.
30(3): p. 79-98.
Parent, M. and B.H. Reich, Governing Information
Technology Risk. California Management Review,
2009. 51(3): p. 134-+.
Trautman, L.J. and K. Altenbaumer-Price, The
board's responsibility for information technology
governance. J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L.,
2010. 28(3): p. 313.
Vincent, N.E., J.L. Higgs, and R.E. Pinsker, Board
and Management-Level Factors Affecting the
Maturity of IT Risk Management Practices. Journal
of Information Systems, 2019. 33(3): p. 117-135.
Read, T.J., Discussion of director responsibility for
IT governance. International journal of accounting
information systems, 2004. 5(2): p. 105-107.
Baysinger, B. and R.E. Hoskisson, The
composition of boards of directors and strategic
control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of
Management review, 1990. 15(1): p. 72-87.
Kim, Y. and A.A. Cannella Jr, Toward a social
capital theory of director selection. Corporate
Governance: An International Review, 2008. 16(4):
p. 282-293.
Brickley, J.A. and J.L. Zimmerman, Corporate
governance myths: comments on Armstrong, Guay,
and Weber. Journal of Accounting and Economics,
2010. 50(2-3): p. 235-245.

9
Page 6055

[49]

[50]

[51]

[52]

[53]

[54]

[55]

[56]

[57]

[58]

[59]

[60]

[61]

[62]

[63]

Van Peteghem, M., et al. Board IT competence and
firm performance. in Fortieth International
Conference on Information Systems, December 1518, 2019, Munich, Germany. 2019.
Yayla, A.A. and Q. Hu, The effect of Board of
directors’ IT awareness on CIO compensation and
firm performance. Decision Sciences, 2014. 45(3):
p. 401-436.
Coertze, J. and R. von Solms. The Board and CIO:
The IT Alignment Challenge. in 2014 47th Hawaii
International Conference on System Sciences.
2014. Waikoloa, HI.
Jo, H. and M.A. Harjoto, Corporate governance
and firm value: The impact of corporate social
responsibility. Journal of business ethics, 2011.
103(3): p. 351-383.
Frias‐Aceituno, J.V., L. Rodriguez‐Ariza, and I.M.
Garcia‐Sanchez, The role of the board in the
dissemination of integrated corporate social
reporting. Corporate social responsibility and
environmental management, 2013. 20(4): p. 219233.
Butler, R. and M.J. Butler, Beyond King III:
Assigning accountability for IT governance in
South African enterprises. South African Journal of
Business Management, 2010. 41(3): p. 33-45.
Best, P. and S. Buckby. Development of a Board IT
Governance (ITG) Review Model. in 2007
Accounting & Finance Association of Australia
and New Zealand Conference (AFAANZ 2007).
2007. Gold Coast, Australia.
Pfeffer, J. and G.R. Salancik, The external control
of organizations: A resource dependence
approach. NY: Harper and Row Publishers, 1978.
Hillman, A.J., A.A. Cannella, and R.L. Paetzold,
The resource dependence role of corporate
directors: Strategic adaptation of board
composition in response to environmental change.
Journal of Management studies, 2000. 37(2): p.
235-256.
Nolan, R. and F.W. McFarlan, Information
technology and the board of directors. Harvard
Business Review, 2005. 83(10): p. 96-+.
Barroso-Castro, C., M.M. Villegas-Periñan, and M.
Dominguez, Board members’ contribution to
strategy: The mediating role of board internal
processes. European research on management and
business economics, 2017. 23(2): p. 82-89.
Rindova, V.P., What corporate boards have to do
with strategy: A cognitive perspective. Journal of
management studies, 1999. 36(7): p. 953-975.
Pugliese, A., et al., Boards of directors'
contribution to strategy: A literature review and
research agenda. Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 2009. 17(3): p. 292-306.
Lan, L.L. and L. Heracleous, Rethinking agency
theory: The view from law. Academy of
management review, 2010. 35(2): p. 294-314.
Posthumus, S. and R. von Solms. Agency theory:
Can it be used to strengthen IT governance? in

[64]

[65]

[66]

[67]

[68]

[69]
[70]

[71]

[72]

[73]

[74]

[75]

[76]

[77]

23rd IFIP International Information Security
Conference. 2008. Milano, Italy.
Héroux, S. and A. Fortin, The moderating role of
IT-business alignment in the relationship between
IT governance, IT competence, and innovation.
Information Systems Management, 2018. 35(2): p.
98-123.
Judge, W.Q. and C.P. Zeithaml, Institutional and
strategic choice perspectives on board involvement
in the strategic decision process. Academy of
management Journal, 1992. 35(4): p. 766-794.
Ingley, C.B. and N.T. Van der Walt, The strategic
board: The changing role of directors in
developing and maintaining corporate capability.
Corporate Governance: An International Review,
2001. 9(3): p. 174-185.
Valentine, E. and G. Stewart. Director
competencies for effective enterprise technology
governance. in Proceedings of the 24th
Australasian Conference on Information Systems
(ACIS 2013). 2013. Melbourne, Australia.
Deloitte CIO Insider. Reinventing tech finance:
The evolution from IT budgets to technology
investments. 2020.
Gartner, Gartner says IT Spending to Grow 3.7%
in 2020. 2020.
Bart, C. and O. Turel, IT and the board of
directors: An empirical investigation into the
“governance questions” Canadian board members
ask about IT. Journal of Information Systems,
2010. 24(2): p. 147-172.
Kambil, A. and H.C. Lucas, The board of directors
and the management of information technology.
Communications of the Association for
Information Systems, 2002. 8(1): p. 26.
Ako-Nai, A. and A.M. Singh, Information
technology governance framework for improving
organisational performance. South African Journal
of Information Management, 2019. 21(1): p. 1-11.
Raghupathi, W., Corporate governance of IT: A
framework for development. Communications of
the ACM, 2007. 50(8): p. 94-99.
Mähring, M., The role of the board of directors in
IT governance: A review and agenda for research,
in AMCIS 2006 Proceedings. 2006: Acapulco,
Mexico. p. 377.
Premuroso, R.F. and S. Bhattacharya, Is there a
relationship between firm performance, corporate
governance, and a firm's decision to form a
technology committee? Corporate Governance: An
International Review, 2007. 15(6): p. 1260-1276.
Kuruzovich, J., G. Bassellier, and V.
Sambamurthy. IT governance processes and IT
alignment: Viewpoints from the board of directors.
in 45th Hawaii International Conference on System
Science (HICSS). 2012. Kauai, HI: IEEE.
Joshi, A., L. Bollen, and H. Hassink, An empirical
assessment of IT governance transparency:
Evidence from commercial banking. Information
Systems Management, 2013. 30(2): p. 116-136.

10
Page 6056

